Introduction
A classical topic in monetary economics is measuring the burden that in ‡ation imposes on society.
The standard methodology, pioneered by Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969) and reviewed in Lucas (2000) , consists of estimating a reduced-form money demand function and measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation as the area underneath money demand. 1 The rationale for this approach is based on competitive general equilibrium models where money enters the utility function, or a cashin-advance constraint. 2 Unfortunately, as pointed out by Wallace (2001) , such models contain hidden inconsistencies and they are ill-suited for normative analysis as they fail to account for the social bene…ts that monetary exchange provides to the economy. To illustrate quantitatively the importance of this critique, Lagos The quantitative insights of LW, however, are subject to the caveat of Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009), regarding the trading mechanisms that are typically assumed when measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation. The problem is that these trading mechanisms are socially ine¢ cient, which raises the concern that the large welfare costs of in ‡ation are not due to the frictions that make money essential but to the adoption of ine¢ cient mechanisms (e.g., the Nash bargaining solution). It is for this reason and others -namely, to establish the essentiality of money and the robustness of policy prescriptions -that Wallace (2001 Wallace ( , 2010 recommends that monetary theory be pursued by applying mechanism design. The objective of this paper is to do precisely that, i.e., to use mechanism design to determine the part of the welfare cost of in ‡ation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone -the irreducible cost of in ‡ation. I will derive the money demand that is part of a constrained-e¢ cient allocation, check whether the model can …t the data, and measure the cost of in ‡ation. 3 I show that the money demand generated by the LW model under socially optimal mechanisms takes the form of a correspondence. Below a threshold for the in ‡ation rate, there is an interval of real balances that are consistent with the implementation of the …rst-best allocation, and the measure of this interval shrinks with in ‡ation. Above a threshold for the in ‡ation rate money demand is a singleton, and real balances and welfare are decreasing with the in ‡ation rate.
When calibrated to …t the data, based on the methodology of Lucas (2000) , I …nd parametrizations such that all the annual observations in the data for the U.S. over are consistent with the model. For such parameterizations the welfare cost of 10 percent in ‡ation is 0. Thus, for plausible calibrations of the LW model moderate in ‡ation generates no burden for society when the only frictions in the environment are the ones that make money essential. This result turns on its head the prevailing wisdom that monetary environments generate large costs of in ‡ation: they only do so to the extent that suboptimal mechanisms are employed. It also con…rms that the standard approach to estimating the cost of in ‡ation, the area underneath money demand, has dubious foundations.
I check the robustness of the results to di¤erent extensions. For instance, I consider di¤erent assumptions regarding the observability of agents'money holdings. I also introduce match-speci…c heterogeneity (idiosyncratic preference shocks) and private information. Finally, I re…ne money demand by introducing a participation decision that endogenizes the frequency at which agents trade. This extension provides a natural way to pin down the transfer of real balances in bilateral matches. The model generates a downward-sloping money demand consistent with the data and, for some parametrizations, the cost of in ‡ation is zero. This is in contrast to Shi (1997) and Rocheteau and Wright (2009) , who showed that under bargaining, social welfare can be nonmonotonic with in ‡ation and small in ‡ation can be bene…cial, thereby justifying departures from the Friedman rule.
There is a growing literature, surveyed in Craig and Rocheteau (2008) , measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the context of microfounded models of monetary exchange under di¤erent trading mechanisms. 4 In contrast to this literature I endogenize the trading mechanism in decentralized 3 In the context of the labor market, the idea of imposing a socially optimal mechanism when calibrating a searchtheoretic model can be found in Shimer (2005) . 4 The paper is organized as follows. The environment is described in Section 2. The optimal mechanism and the money demand correspondence are characterized in Section 3. The model is calibrated in Section 5. Match-speci…c heterogeneity and endogenous participation decisions are introduced in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
The environment
The environment is similar to the one in Lagos and Wright (2005) . Time is discrete and continues
forever. There is a continuum of in…nitely-lived agents with measure one. Each period is divided into two stages. In the …rst stage agents trade in a decentralized market with pairwise meetings, denoted DM, while in the second stage they trade in a centralized market, denoted CM.
In the DM, an agent is either a buyer, with probability n 2 (0; 1), or a seller, with probability 1 n. Up to Section 7 n is exogenous, while in Section 7 the composition of the market is endogenous.
Buyers and sellers are matched bilaterally: a buyer meets a seller with probability b , while a seller meets a buyer with probability s , with n b = (1 n) s . In the CM, agents, who are price-takers, trade a perishable good, called the numéraire good, labor and money.
Agents'preferences are represented by the following utility function:
is not optimal, and the long-run capital income tax is not zero. Boel and Camera (2009) where (1 + r) 1 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, q t is DM consumption, e t is the DM level of e¤ort, c t is CM consumption, and h t is the supply of hours in the CM. For tractability, U is additively separable and linear in hours, U(q; e; c; h) = u(q) (e) + U (c) h. The technology in the DM is such that q = e. The utility function is well-behaved, and q = arg max[u (q) (q)].
I also assume without loss in generality that u(0) = (0) = 0. Output in the CM is produced according to a linear production function in labor, which implies the (real) wage rate is equal to 1.
All goods are perishable across both stages and time. Agents cannot commit to future actions, and individual histories are private information. These assumptions rule out credit arrangements and generate an essential role for money. The quantity of …at money per capita at the beginning of period t is M t > 0, with M t+1 = M t . The money growth rate, 1 + , is constant and new money is injected by lump-sum transfers (or taxes if < 1) in the CM. 6 I will not impose that the money growth rate is chosen optimally since my focus is on socially optimal trading arrangements under di¤erent in ‡ation rates. The price of goods in terms of money in the CM is denoted p t .
Agents'money holdings in a match are not observable: an agent can hide his money holdings or overstate them. 7 This assumption limits the ability of the mechanism to punish the seller in a bilateral match who does not hold su¢ cient real balances. Also, it will be consistent with the de…nition of money that includes demand and checkable deposits, M 1, when I calibrate the model.
Constrained-e¢ cient allocations
I …rst consider a version of the model in which each agent receives an idiosyncratic shock at the beginning of the DM that determines whether he is a buyer (he wants to consume but cannot produce) with probability n, or a seller (he can produce but does not want to consume) with probability 1 n. I set n = 1=2, so that each agent is equally likely to be a buyer or a seller in the DM, and = b = s , which is implied by bilateral matching, and denote = =2.
The terms of trade in the DM are determined according to the following game. In the …rst stage the buyer and the seller announce simultaneously their real balances, z b and z s , respectively. 6 In the case where < 0, the government has the power to impose in…nite penalties on agents who do not pay 
where W (z) is the value function of the agent in the CM. Equation (1) has the following interpre-
tation. An agent is a consumer who meets a producer with probability . He consumes q units of goods and delivers d units of real balances (expressed in terms of CM output) to his trading partner. The terms of trade (q; d) depend on the (truthfully) announced real balances of the buyer and the seller in the match. With probability , the agent is a producer who meets a consumer.
He produces q for his trading partner and receives d real balances. With probability 1 2 , no trade takes place.
The CM problem of the agent is 8 Zhu (2008) proposes a coalition-proof game that guarantees that any trade in the DM is in the pairwise core.
This game works as follows. First, the buyer and the seller in the match announce simultaneously their real money holdings. Second, an allocation that depends on the announced money holdings is proposed. The buyer and the seller simultaneously accept or reject the proposed allocation. If it is rejected by one of the two players, the game ends.
Otherwise, the seller makes a counterproposal. Third, the buyer can choose which trade is carried out, the seller's countero¤er or the initial o¤er.
where T is the lump-sum transfer (expressed in numéraire goods), andẑ is the real balances taken into the next DM. I have used the budget constraint according to which the CM supply of hours is h = c + ẑ z T and the relative price of real balances next period in terms of current-period CM output is p t+1 =p t = . From (2), the maximizing choice ofẑ is independent of z; and W is linear in z, with W z = 1.
Substituting V (ẑ) by its expression given by (1), using the linearity of W (z), and ignoring the constant terms, one can reformulate the agent's problem in the CM as
Divide the previous expression by and denote i (1 + )(1 + r) 1, which can be interpreted as the nominal interest rate that would be paid on an illiquid bond, to get:
Given a mechanism, [q( ; ); d( ; )], a seller reports the level of real balances that maximizes his expected surplus, taking as given that the buyer will report his own real balances truthfully,
. A necessary condition for the mechanism to be incentive-compatible is that the seller's expected surplus is independent of his announced real balances. Consequently, for any incentive-compatible mechanism, the choice of real balances, (3), can be reexpressed as
The optimal choice of real balances maximizes the expected surplus of a buyer in the DM net of the cost of holding real balances. 
function that is equal to one if d z b .
Given that money holdings are unobservable, agents will not hold more money than what they intend to spend, z p = d p . From (4), a necessary condition for the allocation to be incentive feasible
The left side of (5) is the expected surplus of a buyer in the DM, net of the cost of holding real balances according to the proposed allocation. A deviation that is always feasible consists of not accumulating money in the CM and not trading as a buyer in the DM. The expected payo¤ associated with this defection is 0. The allocation must also satisfy the seller's participation constraint,
There is a similar condition for buyers, u (q p ) d p 0, but it is implied by (5) and d p 0.
At this point it is useful to characterize the pairwise core of a meeting between a buyer holding z b real balances and a seller holding z s real balances. The pairwise core, denoted C(z b ; z s ), is the set of all feasible allocations, (q; d) 2 R + z s ; z b , such that no alternative feasible allocations exist that would make the buyer and the seller in the match better o¤, with at least one of the two being strictly better o¤. Formally:
This gives:
If the buyer's real balances are larger than the amount he is willing to pay for the …rst-best level of output, u(q ), then any allocation in the pairwise core implements the e¢ cient level of output, and the transfer of real balances is between the seller's cost and the buyer's willingness to pay. If the buyer's real balances are less than his willingness to pay for the …rst-best level of output, u(q ), but greater than the seller's cost, (q ), then the …rst-best allocation is achieved provided that the seller's surplus is not too large; otherwise, the buyer transfers all of his real balances, and output is less than the e¢ cient level. Finally, if the buyer's real balances are not large enough to compensate the seller for the cost of producing the …rst-best level of output, then any allocation in the pairwise core is such that the buyer transfers all his real balances, and the output level is ine¢ ciently low. (5) and (6) can be implemented by the following coalition-proof trading mechanism:
= arg max
According to (7) I de…ne an optimal mechanism as a trading mechanism described in Lemma 1 that maximizes society's welfare, denoted W.
De…nition 1 An optimal mechanism is a [q ( ; ) ; d ( ; )] de…ned by (7)- (8); where Figure 1 : Implementation of coalition-proof trades solves:
The solution to (9)- (11) is in the pairwise core; otherwise, q p > q and one could reduce both q and d so as to increase the seller's surplus in (10), the buyer's expected surplus net of the cost of holding money in (11) , and the whole match surplus in (9) . The optimal mechanism proposes the DM allocation that maximizes the period expected utility of a representative household subject to the individual rationality constraints of the seller, (10) , and the buyer, (11) . It corresponds to the highestso that (10) and (11) hold. The solution is
where q(i) is the positive solution to (q) = i+ u(q). So while the output level is uniquely deter- The solution to (9)- (11) is represented in Figure 3 . If (q ) i+ u(q ) then q = q and there is an interval of real balances, between the curves (q) and i+ u(q), that are consistent with the …rst-best allocation. If (q ) > i 0 + u(q ), then the …rst-best allocation is not implementable and the quantity traded is q(i 0 ) < q at the intersection of (q) and i 0 + u(q). The level of real balances 
It speci…es the set of real balances that are consistent with an optimal mechanism for a given in ‡ation rate. The next proposition characterizes how money demand, output, and welfare vary with in ‡ation.
Proposition 1 There is
such that The quantity { is the highest nominal interest rate below which the …rst-best level of output is incentive-feasible. The right side of (14) can be interpreted as the expected nonpecuniary rate of return of money. It is the probability that an agent is a buyer in the DM times the …rst-best surplus of a match expressed as a fraction of the cost to produce the …rst-best level of output. So the larger the nonpecuniary rate of return of money, the larger the range of in ‡ation rates consistent with the …rst-best allocation. The …rst part of Proposition 1 also shows that money is super-neutral for low in ‡ation rates, and money demand is decreasing in the sense that the set of implementable real balances at higher in ‡ation rates is contained in the set of implementable real balances at lower in ‡ation rates. See Figure 4 for an illustration of the money demand correspondence. When the buyer's participation constraint binds, i > {, the nonpecuniary rate of return of currency evaluated at the …rst-best level of output is less than the cost of holding currency: so the …rst best is not implementable. In this case, money demand is a singleton, and the output produced and consumed in a match, social welfare, and the transfer of real balances are decreasing with the in ‡ation rate. 
The observability of money holdings
Throughout the paper I assume that money holdings are not observable, i.e., agents can both hide and overstate their money balances. In contrast, Hu, Kennan, and Wallace (2009) assume that while agents can hide their money balances, they cannot overstate them. Before turning to the calibration of the model, it is useful to discuss the importance played by the nonobservability of money balances. To do this, I derive the set of stationary, symmetric, incentive-feasible allocations in the case where money holdings cannot be overstated. 9 One crucial element to determine the set of implementable allocations is a necessary condition under which the deviation that consists of not accumulating money in the CM is not pro…table.
In the case where money holdings cannot be overstated, such a necessary condition takes the form
In contrast to (5), an agent who deviates in the CM and accumulates no money can no longer secure the surplus (q p ) + d p in the subsequent DM by overstating his money balances. 10 Indeed, the mechanism can potentially punish a seller who holds no money by assigning no surplus to this seller. A deviation that is always feasible, however, consists of not accumulating money in the CM and not trading in the subsequent DM. The expected surplus net of the cost of holding money from this deviation is zero. It should be emphasized from (15) that the money holdings of an agent, z p , need not coincide with the transfer in the DM, d p .
Lemma 2 Any allocation (q
and (6) can be implemented by the following coalition-proof trading mechanism:
According to (16) , if both the seller and the buyer in a bilateral match hold (and announce) more than z p units of real balances, then the trade is the allocation in the pairwise core that generates the same surplus for the buyer as the one he would have obtained under (q p ; d p ). According to (17) , if the buyer holds less than z p , then the mechanism proposes the preferred trade of the seller in the 9 For instance, agents could choose to bring only a fraction of their money holdings to a bilateral match in the DM. 1 0 For readers familiar with the literature, the analysis of the set of implementable allocations in Hu, Kennan, and
Wallace (2009) is erroneous, as they impose (5) as a necessary condition for an implementable allocation instead of (15), which is the relevant condition when money holdings cannot be overstated. pairwise core. Symmetrically, according to (18) , if the seller holds less than z p and the buyer holds at least z p , then the mechanism proposes the preferred trade of the buyer in the pairwise core.
The proof of Lemma 2 goes as follows. By construction, the buyer and the seller have incentives to report truthfully their money holdings since their surpluses are nondecreasing with their money holdings. If an agent believes that all his potential partners adhere to the equilibrium play and hold z p units of real balances, then he has no incentives to deviate and hold less than z p since otherwise, from (17) and (18), he would receive no surplus in the DM irrespective of whether he turns into a buyer or a seller. He has no incentive to hold more than z p either since from (16) his expected surplus in the DM is u(q p ) (q p ), which is independent of his real balances (provided they are larger than z p ).
The set of stationary, symmetric, incentive-feasible allocations when agents cannot overstate their money holdings is
Under unobservable money holdings,
The sets A o and A u are represented in Figure 5 . Under unobservable money holdings, all the pairs (q; d) in the light grey area are implementable. If money holdings holding cannot be overstated, the pairs (q; d) in the light and dark grey areas can be implemented. Therefore, under the assumption of unobservable money holdings, the set of implementable real balances is smaller, i.e., for all i 0, 
The irreducible cost of in ‡ation
In the previous section I derived an individual money demand correspondence, D p (i). Following the methodology of Lucas (2000) and LW, the next step is to construct the aggregate money demand and to check whether there are parameter values for which it …ts the data. The model can then be used to measure the cost of in ‡ation.
The aggregate demand for money is de…ned as L M=P Y , where M is the money supply, Y is real aggregate output, and P is the price level. In the data, Y is measured by GDP, P by the GDP de ‡ator, M by M1, and i by the short-term commercial paper rate. Real aggregate output is composed of the CM output, A such that U 0 (A) = 1, and the DM output expressed in terms of the numéraire good, M=p. Hence, Y = A + M=p. Aggregate real balances are M=p = d p . Therefore, the aggregate demand for money is a continuous correspondence de…ned as
From (12)- (13),
I adopt the same functional forms as in LW: U (c) = A ln c, (e) = e, u(q) = is implementable for all the interest rates observed in the data. However, as revealed by Figure   6 , the money demand from the model is a poor …t for the data: all the observations except three lie outside of the money demand correspondence. Intuitively, the optimal mechanism gives agents incentives to accumulate enough real balances to trade the …rst-best level of output, whereas under Nash bargaining the …rst-best level of output is never achieved, even when the cost of holding money is zero. As a consequence, if the model is calibrated to …t the data under Nash bargaining, the money demand under the optimal mechanism will tend to overestimate the money demand in the data. To understand how the model can match the empirical money demand, consider the following two moments: L = min(L t ) is the minimum real balance and L = min(L t ) is the maximum real balance observed in the data. One can choose parameters to match these two moments. To do this, it is useful to rewrite (19) as
change in the fundamental structure of the economy. It could re ‡ect the fact that under an optimal mechanism real balances need not be uniquely determined.
To match these two targets one needs su¢ ciently high, in order to achieve the upper bound for real balances. This can be interpreted as a condition on the size of the gains from trade in the DM.
The welfare cost of a 1 percent in ‡ation is de…ned as the fraction of total consumption that agents would be willing to give up to reduce to 1. For the two parameterizations above, the …rst-best level of output is achieved for all in ‡ation rates observed in the data. Therefore, the welfare cost of 10 percent in ‡ation is 0. In LW, under Nash bargaining, the cost of in ‡ation is 3.2 percent of GDP every year. In the case where buyers play an ultimatum game, the cost of in ‡ation is lowered to 1.2 percent of GDP, in the same ballpark as the estimate of Lucas (2000) .
Using the same calibration methodology but applying a mechanism design approach, I just showed that the part of the welfare cost of in ‡ation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone, the irreducible cost of in ‡ation, is zero.
The cost of in ‡ation that is measured in LW and the follow-up literature (see the survey in Craig and Rocheteau, 2008 ) is essentially a welfare loss that can be attributed to suboptimal trading mechanisms. Monetary frictions create a large welfare loss to the extent that they make mechanisms that are optimal in pure credit economies-economies where bilateral credit can be enforced-suboptimal when credit is no longer available. This is not to say that these trading mechanisms are not empirically plausible-the data does not seem able to discriminate between di¤erent mechanisms. But the trading mechanisms that have been imposed in the literature are not part of the frictions that make money essential, and when measuring the cost of in ‡ation, one should disentangle the cost associated with those pure monetary frictions from the costs that stem from socially ine¢ cient trading protocols.
6 Match-speci…c heterogeneity
So far I have assumed that all buyers have the same preferences and all sellers have the same technology. If there is heterogeneity across matches, and if agents have some private information regarding their preferences or technologies, it is unclear whether the …rst-best allocation, which involves di¤erent production levels in di¤erent matches, is incentive feasible for some in ‡ation rates. For instance, in an environment in which sellers o¤er price schedules to buyers in bilateral matches, Ennis (2008) …nds that the equilibrium is ine¢ cient (even at the Friedman rule) and the cost of in ‡ation is large.
In this section I extend the model by assuming that once a buyer and a seller are matched, a preference shock is realized that determines how much the buyer values the output produced by the seller. Preferences are represented by the utility function "u(q) (e) + U (c) h, where
"] is a match-speci…c component drawn from a distribution G("). 12 The preference shock, ", is private information to the buyer.
An allocation rule in the DM maps a triple, ("; z b ; z s ), the announced match-speci…c component and the announced buyer's and seller's real balances, into a match allocation, (q " ; d " ), which speci…es the output in a match and the transfer of real balances. The mechanism must be incentive compatible: the buyer is willing to reveal truthfully his preference shock and real balances, while the seller is willing to reveal truthfully his real balances. The mechanism must also be individually rational, i.e., buyers and sellers are willing to go along with the proposed allocation. Because there is no clear notion of coalition-proof equilibrium in the presence of ex-post heterogeneity and private information, I adopt the weaker notion of individually rational (IR) implementability that requires the trades in pairwise meetings to be immune to individual defection.
Suppose the planner seeks to implement symmetric, stationary allocations f(q
Buyers will be required to hold z p = max " (d A necessary condition for a buyer to have incentives to reveal truthfully his preference shock is
According to (21) , the buyer will achieve a higher surplus by reporting his true preference shock, ", instead of some other value, " 0 . From (21)
. Buyers with a high marginal utility of consumption receive (weakly) more output and spend (weakly) more real balances than buyers with a low marginal 1 2 This formalization is borrowed from Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) .
utility of consumption. This implies that an agent's real balances must be z = d p " . Individual rationality in a match requires
Both the buyer and the seller enjoy a positive surplus. Finally, necessary conditions for an agent in the CM to accumulate z units of real balances are:
for all z 0 2 fd
The deviation that consists of reducing one's real balances from z to z 0 < z and choosing the best o¤er such that d p " 0 < z 0 must not be pro…table. Note that when evaluating this deviation I took into account only the buyer's expected surplus in the DM, net where A (i) is the set of pairs (z; d`) 2 R 2+ such that (21), (22) , and (23) hold with q " h = q h and q "`= q `. I normalize " h = 1. To make the match-speci…c heterogeneity relevant I take "`= 0:5 and h = 0:5. The frequency of meetings is assumed to be maximum, = 0:5, and I set a = 0:9.
I choose the parameter A so that all points in the data are in the money demand correspondence.
See Figure 9 . For this example, the welfare cost of (moderate) in ‡ation is 0. 
Continuous preference shocks
Suppose that the preference shock is distributed uniformly on the interval [0; 1]. From (21)
Taking the limit as " 0 approaches ",
If the …rst-best level of output is implemented, "u 0 (q
In order to implement the …rst-best, the transfer of real balances must be equal to the disutility cost of the seller. So the participation constraints (22) are satis…ed.
I now turn to the buyer's incentives to accumulate real balances in the CM. Consider a buyer with d p " real balances in a match of type ". This buyer can buy at most q " units of output. He will announce a preference type,", that maximizes ["u(q " ) (q " )] I fq " q " g . The solution is" = " if " " and otherwise" =". Provided that the buyer has enough real balances to purchase the …rst-best level of output given his preference type, he will announce his type truthfully. If he doesn't hold enough real balances, he will announce the highest type consistent with his real balances,".
Therefore, the buyer's choice of real balances in the CM is equivalent to the choice of a threshold, ", below which the buyer consumes the …rst-best level of output and above which the buyer is constrained by his real balances. It solves
The …rst-order condition is
Interestingly, this …rst-order condition is the same as the one obtained in Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) under buyers-take-all bargaining. Unless i = 0, the …rst-best is not implementable. 13 This also tells us that the cost of in ‡ation will be bounded above by the cost obtained under buyerstake-all bargaining, which is about 1.2 percent of GDP.
So far I assumed that money holdings were not observable and could be overstated. If money holdings cannot be overstated, then agents will be willing to accumulate the socially e¢ cient quantity of real balances, d
There is an interval of in ‡ation rates above the Friedman rule that are consistent with the implementation of the …rst-best.
Endogenous participation
As shown in Section 5 under an optimal mechanism, aggregate money demand is a correspondence:
for low in ‡ation rates the division of the surplus in a bilateral match is not uniquely pinned down.
A natural way to endogenize the division of the match surplus -thereby re…ning money demandis to let agents choose which side of the DM market they participate in. Indeed, the division of the gains from trade in the DM a¤ects the composition of the market in terms of buyers and sellers, the measure of trades, and therefore society's welfare. In order to endogenize participation, I follow the approach of Shi (1997) I assume that there is a unit measure of ex ante identical agents who choose to be either buyers or sellers in the DM. The decision to become a buyer or seller in period t is taken at the beginning of the previous CM, in period t 1. Suppose, for example, that at the beginning of the CM, individuals invest in a (costless) technology that allows them to either produce DM goods or consume them, and it is only possible to invest in one technology. 14 Let n denote the measure of buyers in the DM, = 1 n n the ratio of sellers per buyer (market tightness), and ( ) the matching probability of a buyer. The matching function has standard properties: (0) = 0, 0 > 0, 0 (0) 1, 0 (1) = 0, 00 < 0. The matching probability of a seller is ( )= . Society's welfare is measured by
Let denote n the composition of the market that maximizes the number of trades, n = arg max n 1 n n :
The …rst-best allocation is such that q = q , n = n , and c = c . 
where j 2 fb; sg. The value of being a buyer in the DM satis…es such that 1. For all i < {, q p = q , n p = n , and
Moreover, @W @i = 0 and
2. For all i > {, q p < q , n p < n . Moreover, @W @i < 0 and
In contrast to Shi (1997) and Rocheteau and Wright (2009) , where terms of trade are determined by bargaining, under an optimal mechanism the …rst-best allocation can be implemented for low in ‡ation rates. If the cost of holding money is lower than the threshold {, then the …rst-best allocation is incentive feasible. According to (40), the transfer of real balances is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate. As the nominal interest rate increases, it is more costly to hold money and in order to keep the buyers' and sellers' incentives to participate in the market unchanged, buyers must be compensated by a larger share of the match surplus (which implies that they hold fewer real balances). If the cost of holding money is larger than the threshold {, then the …rst-best allocation is no longer incentive feasible. The allocation is chosen so that agents are just indi¤erent between participating and not participating in the market. In this case, output and the measure of buyers in the DM decrease with in ‡ation.
I now turn to the calibration of the model. As above,
The aggregate demand for money is
I adopt the same functional forms as before, (e) = e, u(q) = and restrict a in (0; 1). I adopt the matching function that is commonly used in the literature, ( ) = 1+ . The matching probability of a buyer, (1 n), is proportional to the measure of sellers. Symmetrically, the matching probability of a seller, n, is proportional to the measure of buyers. The measure of DM trades is maximum when n = 1=2.
In Figure 
Conclusion
I have studied the welfare cost of in ‡ation in an environment in which money plays an essential role.
When the trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is chosen optimally, aggregate money demand takes the form of a correspondence that can …t the data over the period 1900-2006. The welfare cost of moderate in ‡ation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone is zero. Hence, in contrast to some common wisdom, in ‡ation does not need to impose a large burden on society when the only frictions in the environment are the ones that make money useful. This insight is robust to di¤erent assumptions regarding the observability of money holdings, the introduction of match-speci…c heterogeneity, and endogenous participation decisions. It is important to recall that this prediction relies on the trading mechanism being socially e¢ cient. If agents were to trade according to some other mechanism -some mechanisms despite being socially ine¢ cient have strong strategic foundations -the cost of in ‡ation would be large, as argued in the literature. This 
Since d p = (q p ) with 0 > 0,
where I used that q p < q and hence u 0 (q p ) 0 (q p ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote A (i) the set of pairs (z; d`) 2 R 2+ such that (21), (22) , and (23) hold with q " h = q h and q "`= q `. If i = 0, the constraints (21) and (22) , which imply (23), can be reexpressed as:
(q " ) d " "u(q " ) for all " 2 f"`; " h g .
The set A (0) is illustrated in the …gure below. such that (39) holds with q = q and n = n p . From (37) , such a deviation raises W. Moreover, from (46), q p 6 = q since otherwise n p = n and i {. Consequently, q p < q and @W @i < 0. To show that n p < n , notice …rst from (46) that n p 6 = n . From (45) n is a decreasing function of q. So if n p > n , one can reduce n and increase q, which would raise welfare. 
